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abstract: The best known of the conflicts occurring in eusocial
Hymenoptera is queen-worker conflict over sex ratio. So far, sex
ratio theory has mostly focused on optimal investment in the pro-
duction of male versus female sexuals, neglecting the investment in
workers. Increased investment in workers decreases immediate sexual
productivity but increases expected future colony productivity. Thus,
an important issue is to determine the queen’s and workers’ optimal
investment in each of the three castes (workers, female sexuals, and
male sexuals), taking into account a possible trade-off between pro-
duction of female sexuals and workers (both castes developing from
diploid female eggs). Here, we construct a simple and general kin
selection model that allows us to calculate the evolutionarily stable
investments in the three castes, while varying the identity of the party
controlling resource allocation (relative investment in workers, fe-
male sexuals, and male sexuals). Our model shows that queens and
workers favor the investment in workers that maximizes lifetime
colony productivity of sexual males and females, whatever the colony
kin structure. However, worker production is predicted to be at this
optimum only if one of the two parties has complete control over
resource allocation, a situation that is evolutionarily unstable because
it strongly selects the other party to manipulate sex allocation in its
favor. Queens are selected to force workers to raise all the males by
limiting the number of eggs they lay, whereas workers should respond
to egg limitation by raising a greater proportion of the female eggs
into sexual females rather than workers as a means to attain a more
female-biased sex allocation. This tug-of-war between queens and
workers leads to a stable equilibrium where sex allocation is between
the queen and worker optima and the investment in workers is below
both parties’ optimum. Our model further shows that, under most
conditions, female larvae are in strong conflict with queens and
workers over their developmental fate because they value their own
reproduction more than that of siblings. With the help of our model,
we also investigate how variation in queen number and number of
matings per queen affect the level of conflict between queens, work-
ers, and larvae and ultimately the allocation of resource in the three
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castes. Finally, we make predictions that allow us to test which party
is in control of sex allocation and caste determination.
Keywords: Hymenoptera, colony growth, kin selection, conflict, model.
One of the major trade-offs in an organism’s life history
is that between investment in reproduction versus body
growth (Stearns 1992). Spending resources on immediate
reproduction provides direct fitness gain but decreases so-
matic growth and expected future reproduction. The evo-
lutionarily optimal strategy is continued growth until the
fitness gain as a result of increased size is exactly counter-
balanced by the fitness obtained by immediate reproduc-
tion. This principle can be used to predict investment in
colony growth in social insects with morphological castes,
in which workers are the equivalent of somatic tissue and
new queens (gynes) and males constitute the reproductive
investment. However, in contrast to unitary organisms that
consist of clonal cells ( ), colonies of social insectsrp 1
contain individuals whose relatedness is lower than 1
( ). This genetic heterogeneity results in potential ge-r ! 1
netic conflicts over resource allocation and reproductive
decisions (Hamilton 1964; Pamilo 1991; Ratnieks and
Reeve 1992; Keller and Chapuisat 1999; Keller and Reeve
1999). Genetic conflicts are of particular importance in
eusocial Hymenoptera (ants, bees, and wasps), whereby
the haplodiploid sex-determination system creates relat-
edness asymmetries among family members. Because
workers are more closely related to their sisters than to
their brothers, they should favor a female-biased sex al-
location (here defined as the relative investment in gynes
and males). In contrast, queens are equally related to their
sons and daughters and favor an even resource investment
in both sexes. Thus, queen-worker conflict over sex al-
location arises.
Sex ratio conflict has been extensively investigated both
theoretically and empirically (e.g., Trivers and Hare 1976;
Charnov 1978; Nonacs 1986; Boomsma and Grafen 1990,
1991; Pamilo 1991; Sundstro¨m 1994; Bourke and Franks
1995; Crozier and Pamilo 1996; Chapuisat and Keller
1999). In contrast, little attention has been paid to the
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question of how conflict among colony members extends
from resource allocation to colony growth and mainte-
nance (worker production) versus reproduction (produc-
tion of males and gynes). The different authors who have
asked this question have reached different conclusions.
Pamilo (1991) suggested that conflict over colony growth
arises between queens and workers, with workers prefer-
ring a relatively greater investment in gynes than workers
as compared to the queen. However, Bourke and Chan
(1999) suggested that conflict between queens and workers
should be absent if the relative investment in worker and
sexual production does not affect a colony’s sex allocation
(the proportional investment in gynes vs. males). That is,
both queens and workers should favor the investment in
workers that ultimately maximizes the lifetime colony pro-
duction of reproductive individuals. Finally, yet another
conclusion was reached by Bourke and Ratnieks (1999)
when they took into account the process of caste deter-
mination, whereby female larvae irreversibly develop into
workers or queens that are morphologically and physio-
logically specialized for the task that they will perform.
The authors found that conflict between queens and work-
ers arose over the developmental pathway of individual
female larvae, with workers preferring a higher proportion
of female larvae to develop into gynes than the queen.
Bourke and Ratnieks’s (1999) analysis also included the
interests of the female brood itself. They found that female
larvae are in conflict with queens and workers under a
wide range of conditions. Because female larvae are more
closely related to themselves than to the sexual females
they would raise as workers, they frequently benefit by
becoming sexual females themselves under conditions
where queens and workers would benefit from increasing
the size of the colony’s workforce.
In this article, we reconsider the problem of potential
conflict over resource allocation in the production of
workers, males, and gynes. We construct a simple and
general kin-selection model that allows us to investigate
the simultaneous evolution of investment in workers and
sex allocation. This is a significant step toward a better
understanding of optimal reproductive allocation and sex
ratio conflict because previous models dealt either with
sex allocation, neglecting investment in colony growth, or
with optimal investment in colony growth in the situation
where sex allocation is fixed. Moreover, in our analyses,
we explicitly consider the power that queens and workers
have to manipulate resource allocation and the selection
pressures that act on queens, workers, and larvae to en-
courage manipulation.
Our model shows that queen-worker conflict occurs
over sex allocation but not colony growth. The evolution-
arily stable investment in workers is the same for both
parties when one of them has complete control over re-
source allocation (i.e., the relative investment in workers,
gynes, and males). Complete control by one party is, how-
ever, evolutionarily unstable because it strongly selects the
other party to manipulate sex allocation in its favor. When
no party can monopolize control over resource allocation,
the investment in worker production is predicted to be
lower than the two parties’ optimum. This is because the
queen’s and workers’ attempts to bias sex allocation in
their favor are at the detriment of worker production. Our
model also confirms the occurrence of conflict between
adult colony members and female larvae over their de-
velopmental fate. Under most conditions, individual fe-
male larvae benefit if they escape adult control of caste
determination and develop into gynes. Finally, our model
sheds light on the reasons why previous authors reached
different conclusions about whether queens and workers
are in conflict over the relative amount of resources that
should be allocated to worker production.
The Model
In our model, we consider a colony with one or several
queens (mated with a variable number of males) and sterile
workers. Males and gynes are assumed to disperse so that
inbreeding, local mate competition (Hamilton 1967), or
local resource competition (Clark 1978) do not occur.
Workers, gynes, and males are assumed to be equally costly
to produce. Therefore, the proportional investment in one
class of individuals corresponds to the number of indi-
viduals of this class relative to the total number of indi-
viduals produced. We will thus use the terms “sex ratio”
and “sex allocation” interchangeably throughout the ar-
ticle. In the colony, investment in workers, gynes, and
males is determined by two parameters. The first, f, de-
scribes the proportion of resources that are allocated to
the production of females (i.e., workers and gynes, here-
after referred to as “proportional investment in females”).
Correspondingly, the quantity ( ) is the proportion1 f
of resources invested in the production of males. The sec-
ond parameter determining resource allocation is w, the
proportion of the allocation to females that is devoted to
the production of workers. The remainder ( ) goes1 w
into the production of gynes. Because of the equal cost of
gynes and workers, the parameter w therefore describes
the proportion of females that will develop into workers.
In sum, the colony invests a proportion fw of resources
in workers, a proportion in gynes, and ( )f(1 w) 1 f
in males. The population means of the proportional in-
vestments are given by capital letters, that is, FW into
workers, into gynes, and into males. ForF(1W ) (1 F)
the sake of simplicity, our model does not consider any
temporal variation of investment that might occur in the
course of colony ontogeny. It predicts the overall invest-
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Figure 1: Relative productivity of a colony as a function of proportional
investment in workers. The solid line shows the total productivity (work-
ers and sexuals), the dotted line, the productivity of sexuals only.
ment in workers, gynes, and males over the whole colony
life.
Because per-worker productivity declines with the num-
ber of workers per colony in eusocial Hymenoptera (Brian
1956; Tschinkel 1993; Sundstro¨m 1995), overall colony
productivity (biomass of workers, gynes, and males pro-
duced) is assumed to increase with colony size, according
to the following diminishing return function: b(f, w)p
. Under this function, productivity varies be-21 (1 fw)
tween 0, when the relative investment in workers is 0, and
1 (maximum productivity), when all resources are allo-
cated to worker production (fig. 1, solid line). The pro-
ductivity in terms of sexual biomass (gynes and males) is
given by (fig. 1, dotted line). (Note thatb(f, w)(1 fw)
choosing another function with diminishing returns does
not affect the qualitative results of our model.)
The inclusive fitness VX of a colony member X depends
on the biomass of males and gynes produced, the regres-
sion relatedness of females (gFX) and males (gMX) to X, the
reproductive values of females ( ) and malesn p 1F
( ), and the mating success of female reproduc-n p 0.5M
tives ( ) and males ( ) (Crozier and1/[F(1W )] 1/[1 F]
Pamilo 1996). Taking into account these variables, the fit-
ness of individual X is given as
f(1 w)g n (1 f )g nf X f mX m
V p b(f, w)  . (1)X [ ]F(1W ) (1 F)
The fitness function (1) allows us to calculate the evolu-
tionarily stable (ES) values for the proportional investment
in females f and the proportion of females developing into
workers w in function of who in the colony has control
of these two variables and what the kin structure of the
colony is.
The question of who controls the two parameters (f and
w) that determine resource allocation is important because
queens and workers might differ in their optimal values.
The queen can produce males by laying unfertilized hap-
loid eggs and females by producing fertilized diploid eggs.
She is therefore a priori in control of proportional in-
vestment in females. However, workers may alter the sex
allocation by selectively eliminating brood of one sex (most
likely males, as has been demonstrated in the ant Formica
exsecta; Sundstro¨m et al. 1996; Chapuisat et al. 1997) to
raise more individuals of the other sex. In this way, workers
can gain control over proportional investment in females.
There has been considerable discussion about who (the
queen, the workers, or the female larvae) is in control of
caste determination and therefore able to regulate the pro-
portion of females that develop into workers versus gynes.
Female development had long been assumed to be ma-
nipulated by queen-produced pheromones (Brian 1980;
Fletcher and Ross 1985; Ho¨lldobler and Bartz 1985). How-
ever, this view has been challenged on theoretical grounds,
and there is indeed no empirical data in favor of phero-
monal control, whereby queens are able to chemically force
female larvae to develop into workers rather than queens
(Keller and Nonacs 1993). On the contrary, there is in-
creasing evidence that queen pheromones act as honest
signals of queen fecundity to which other colony members
respond by altering reproductive decisions (e.g., Pettis et
al. 1997; Ortius and Heinze 1999). An alternative way for
queens to influence caste determination is by producing
different types of eggs, which has been documented in two
species of ants. In Pheidole pallidula, queens produce dip-
loid eggs that vary in their content of juvenile hormone
and develop either into workers or gynes (Passera 1980;
Wheeler 1986). Similarly, Formica polyctena queens can
apparently bias caste determination by varying egg size
and the amount of RNA and other biochemical substances
in the eggs (Wheeler 1986, and references therein). Since
it is yet unclear who is controlling caste determination and
because there might be interspecific variation, we will con-
sider the three possible scenarios of caste determination,
with the developmental fate of larvae being either under
the control of the queen, the workers, or the larvae
themselves.
In our model, we will first consider the case where either
the queens or the workers have complete control over f
and w, that is, the proportional investment in females and
the proportion of females raised as workers. Complete
queen control may occur when queens limit the number
of eggs produced, thus making eggs a limiting resource,
thereby forcing workers to raise all the brood present in
the colony (Rosenheim et al. 1996), and when queens
control caste determination, which may be the case in
Sex Ratio Conflict and Worker Production 169
species with blastogenic caste determination (i.e., when
maternal effects determine the developmental fate of fe-
male brood; Passera 1980; Pamilo 1982; Wheeler 1986;
Helms 1999). Alternatively, complete worker control may
occur when the number of female eggs is not limited, when
workers are able to assess the sex of eggs or young larvae
and eliminate males without any cost and thereby alter
the queen-produced primary sex ratio, and when workers
control caste determination, for example, through differ-
ential feeding of the larvae.
Next we will consider the case of mixed queen and
worker control over resource allocation. Although single-
party control is possible under a restricted set of conditions
(see above), queens and workers most likely share control
over investment in the majority of species (Trivers and
Hare 1976; Bourke and Franks 1995). This is because,
when sex allocation is at one party’s optimum, the other
party is under strong selection to manipulate sex allocation
to its own advantage. We will consider the most likely
situation of mixed control (queens control the propor-
tional investment into females [workers  gynes] by lim-
iting the number of eggs, whereas workers control caste
determination, i.e., the proportion of females developing
into workers vs. the proportion developing into gynes).
Note that, in this case, worker fitness will be principally
limited by the number of female eggs available and not
so much the overall number of eggs. Active egg limitation
by the queen is therefore equivalent to a limitation of
female eggs only, in which case workers raise all female
eggs and invest the remaining resources in the rearing of
as many male eggs as possible.
Single-Party Control
The ES investment pattern of a single party in control of
resource allocation ( f and w) can be found by substituting
the corresponding values of relatedness for that party in
equation (1) and maximizing the function simultaneously
for f and w at and . For queen∗ ∗wp Wp w fp Fp f
control under monogyny (single-queen colonies) and
monandry (single-queen mating), we substitute the relat-
edness values and . The ES solution isg p 0.5 g p 1f m
( , ), meaning that a proportion of∗ ∗f p 0.71 w p 0.59Q Q
0.71 of the resources is invested in females, of which a
proportion of 0.59 goes into workers. The resulting allo-
cation pattern is 0.42 of the resources invested in workers,
0.29 in gynes, and 0.29 in males. The investment in males
and gynes is even, as predicted from sex ratio theory when
queens control colony sex allocation (Trivers and Hare
1976), and the allocation to workers is the one that max-
imizes sexual production (see fig. 1). The numerical value
of the relative investment in workers has of course no
biological meaning as it critically depends on the function
b( ) that was chosen. A different ES investment in work-f, w
ers would be found if one would use a different function,
but the important point is that it would always be the one
that maximizes the overall productivity of males and gynes.
The ES values of f and w under complete worker control
of resource allocation can be obtained in the same manner
by substituting and in equation (1)g p 0.75 g p 0.5f m
and maximizing for f and w. The values obtained are
( , ), which corresponds to a propor-∗ ∗f p 0.86 w p 0.49W W
tional investment of 0.42 in workers, 0.44 in gynes, and
0.14 in males. The optimal investment in workers is the
same as for queens, and it is the value that maximizes the
colony’s overall production of gynes and males. However,
contrary to queens, workers favor a three times higher
investment in gynes than in males, as predicted by sex
ratio theory (Trivers and Hare 1976).
The more complex kin structures that result from poly-
andry (multiple mating by queens) or polygyny (multiple
reproductive queens per colony) affect relatedness asym-
metries between colony members and thus the workers’
optimal sex allocation. However, under both complete
queen control and complete worker control, the ES in-
vestment in workers is not influenced by the level of poly-
andry or polygyny because both parties benefit from max-
imizing overall colony productivity of gynes.
In summary, complete control of resource allocation by
either queens or workers leads to each party favoring the
relative investment in worker production that maximizes
overall productivity of reproductives, and this is true what-
ever the kin structure of the colony. In contrast, queens
and workers diverge in the optimal investment in males
and gynes, as expected from sex ratio theory. Conse-
quently, queen-worker conflict arises over the allocation
of resources to male and female reproductives but not over
worker production.
Mixed Control
When colony and population sex allocation are at one
party’s optimum, this exerts a selective pressure on the
other party to bias sex allocation to its own advantage.
Our model allows us to determine the strength and di-
rection of this selective pressure by calculating the selection
gradient, which is the coefficient of a regression of fitness
on phenotype (Lande and Arnold 1983). The selection
gradient is equivalent to the derivative of the fitness func-
tion with respect to phenotype. We can thus quantify the
selection acting on queens and workers by calculating the
partial derivatives of their inclusive fitnesses with respect
to f and w.
Consider first the case of complete worker control under
monogyny and monandry. The predicted proportional in-
vestment in workers is 0.42, and the sex allocation is female
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Figure 2: Evolutionary equilibria of proportional investment in females
(f ), and proportion of workers among females (w), as a function of (A)
queen mating frequency (k; assuming monogyny and equal paternity
among males) and (B) the number of nestmate queens (n; assuming full
sister queens [gQQ p 0.75], single mating, and equal contribution of
queens to the production of workers, males, and gynes). Here, f is as-
sumed to be under queen control, whereas w is controlled by the workers.
biased by 3 : 1. The gradient of selection on queens to alter
the proportional investment in females is given by the
partial derivative of equation (1) with respect to f. Sub-
stituting the values , , , andg p 0.5 g p 1 Fp 0.86f m
gives a partial derivative ofwp Wp 0.49 b pf
. This negative value indicates that com-dV /dfp 1.35Q
plete worker control of resource allocation selects queens
to decrease the colony’s proportional investment in fe-
males, which can be achieved by producing a more male-
biased primary sex ratio and limiting the number of eggs
laid.
Alternatively, in the case of complete queen control of
caste allocation, the proportional investment in workers
is still 0.42, but the sex allocation is now even. The gradient
of selection acting on workers can be obtained by the
partial derivative of worker fitness with respect to w at
, , and substituting the workers’fp Fp 0.71 Wp 0.59
relatedness to males and gynes ( , ),g p 0.75 g p 0.5f m
which gives . This negative valueb p dV /dwp 0.41w W
indicates that workers benefit from directing a greater pro-
portion of the female brood toward gyne development
even though this decreases overall colony productivity.
In summary, neither complete queen control nor com-
plete worker control of resource allocation are stable evo-
lutionary equilibria. Both situations lead to strong selec-
tion on the party not in control of resource allocation to
manipulate investment to its own favor. If manipulation
is possible, mixed control of caste allocation will arise and
queen and worker strategies of manipulation and coun-
termanipulation will evolve in response to each other. A
stable equilibrium will be reached when the queen cannot
increase her inclusive fitness by altering the proportional
investment in females via the primary sex ratio produced
and when workers cannot increase their inclusive fitness
by changing the proportion of female larvae raised as
workers versus gynes. We can find the equilibrium for f
and w by solving the equation system
VQ p 0,Ff ∗fpFpf
VW p 0, (2)Fw ∗wpWpw
while substituting the corresponding relatedness values.
Under monandry and monogyny, the equilibrium values
are and , corresponding to a pro-∗ ∗f p 0.72 w p 0.51
portional investment of 0.36 in workers, 0.35 in gynes,
and 0.29 in males. This indicates that colony productivity
is suboptimal because the proportional investment in
workers is !0.42. Sex allocation is intermediate between
the queen and worker optima, the female-to-male invest-
ment ratio being at 1.2 : 1. (Note again that the numerical
values should only be considered as indicative of the qual-
itative but not quantitative change in resource allocation.)
The ES values of f and w under polyandry or polygyny
can be calculated by substituting the corresponding relat-
edness values in equation (2). Polyandry reduces the re-
latedness among female offspring of the queen (workers
and gynes), whereas worker-male relatedness remains con-
stant. Hence, relatedness asymmetry decreases as queen
mating frequency increases and workers benefit less from
biasing sex allocation toward females. Therefore, multiple
mating reduces conflict between queens and workers over
sex allocation, and ES resource allocation tends toward the
values obtained under complete queen control (fig. 2A;
calculations assume even paternity of the queen’s mates).
Concurrent with this tendency, higher queen mating fre-
quencies result in an increase in the proportional invest-
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Figure 3: Evolutionary equilibria of proportional investment in workers
( fw) in the case where queens control the proportional investment in
females ( f ) and workers control the proportion of workers among fe-
males (w), as a function of (A) queen mating frequency (k; assuming
single-queen colonies and equal paternity among males), and (B) the
number of nestmate queens (n; assuming full sister queens [gQQp 0.75],
single mating, and equal contribution of queens to the production of
workers, males, and gynes).
ment in workers which asymptotically approaches the op-
timal value of 0.42 (fig. 3A).
Increased levels of polygyny also lead to a smaller fe-
male-biased sex allocation and to an increase in the relative
investment in workers (figs. 2B, 3B; calculations assume
equal contribution of queens to the production of workers,
gynes, and males). The effect of increased queen number
is stronger the more closely queens are related. If queens
are unrelated, the ES sex allocation and the relative in-
vestment in workers are not affected by changes in queen
number and remain the same as under monandry and
monogyny. This is because relatedness asymmetry is un-
affected by variation in queen number when queens are
unrelated (Frank 1987).
Larval Control of Caste Determination
So far we have only considered the workers’ and queens’
interests. We will now investigate whether the interests of
the developing larvae themselves diverge from those of
workers and queens. Diverging interests of female larvae
would be indicated by selection favoring larvae who es-
caped adult control of caste determination. Whether this
is the case can be investigated with our model. Consider
a mutant larva that controls its own caste determination
and develops with probability q into a worker and (1
) into a gyne. Other larvae in the colony in which theq
mutant occurred become workers and gynes with prob-
abilities w and ( ), respectively, whereby w is deter-1 w
mined by either the queen or workers. Assume also, for
simplicity, that the population investment patterns are the
same as in this colony, that is, and .Wp w Fp f
The inclusive fitness of the mutant larva VM is equal to
the sum of its inclusive fitness if developing into a worker
(DVW) and the inclusive fitness if developing into a gyne
(DVG), weighted by the respective probabilities, V pM
. The inclusive fitness gained byq(DV ) (1 q)(DV )W G
worker development DVW is equal to the number of ad-
ditional males and gynes a colony would produce with the
help of one additional worker multiplied by the larva’s
relatedness to these sexual females and males and their
mating success. The increase in colony productivity can
be calculated as follows: if de-s(f, w)p b(f, w)(1 fw)
scribes the relative production of sexuals in the focal col-
ony, the number of extra sexuals produced as a result of
one additional worker is given by . This expressionds/fdw
is the slope of sexual production on investment in workers
(fw). The division by f is necessary because overall colony
productivity varies between 0 and 1, whereas the invest-
ment in workers (fw) varies between 0 (for ) andwp 0
f (for ). Dividing by f corrects for this difference inwp 1
scale, and one obtains the number of gynes produced per
worker. The direct fitness obtained by a larva developing
into a gyne (DVG) is simply equal to her expected mating
success , its relatedness to itself being 1. The(1/F[1W ])
overall mutant inclusive fitness can thus be written as
f(1 w) g n (1 f ) g nds 1 f X f mX m
V p q M [ ]( ) ( )dw f 1 fw F(1W ) 1 fw (1 F)
1
 (1 q) . (3)
F(1W )
The gradient of selection acting on q, the larva’s proba-
bility of developing into a worker, is the partial derivative
of VM with respect to q. This value depends on the colony
and population investment pattern ( ). The selectionf, w
pressure on q for all f and w values in the range between
the two extremes of complete worker and complete queen
control is given in figure 4. The selection gradient is always
strongly negative, indicating that a single mutant larva
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Figure 4: Selection differential (b) on a mutant female larva’s probability to develop into a worker (q) as a function of egg sex ratio ( f ) and
proportion of female larvae raised as workers (w).
always benefits to develop into a gyne, and this for all
possible values of f and w.
The question arises as to what will be the equilibrium
resource allocation in the colony when all larvae are in
control of their developmental fate. To investigate this, we
need to determine the evolutionarily stable proportion of
larvae (w) developing into workers and the adaptive re-
sponse of colony members (workers and queens) in terms
of the proportion of females f they would produce. To find
the equilibrium, we have to maximize simultaneously the
inclusive fitness of the larvae and the party controlling f.
For larvae, we replace q in equation (3) with w (because
at equilibrium all larvae adopt the same optimal strategy)
and substitute the corresponding relatedness values. The
resulting equation is derived with respect to w. For the
party controlling f, we substitute the corresponding relat-
edness values in Equation 1 and derive with respect to f.
The two derivatives are then set equal to 0 and solved for
f and w at and .∗ ∗fp Fp f wp Wp w
At equilibrium, the investment in workers is very low
and the sex allocation strongly female biased. Under mon-
andry, monogyny, and queen control of proportional in-
vestment in females, the equilibrium is at and∗f p 0.74
, corresponding to a proportional investment∗w p 0.07
of 0.05 in workers, 0.69 in gynes, and 0.26 in males. If
proportional investment in females is controlled by work-
ers, the equilibrium is at and , that∗ ∗f p 0.87 w p 0.09
is, a proportion of 0.08 of the resources is invested in
workers, 0.80 in gynes, and 0.12 in males. The investment
in workers will be even lower when queens are mated to
several males (fig. 5A, 5C ) or if colonies contain several
queens (fig. 5B, 5D). The decrease in worker production
associated with the higher levels of polygyny is more pro-
nounced the less queens are related to each other.
Note that, as in previous analyses, the numerical values
given here have no significance per se because they directly
depend on the function b( ) that was chosen. However,f, w
the qualitative results of the analyses are not affected by
the particular function, as long as it is one with dimin-
ishing returns, and the important point is that larvae will
always be in strong conflict with queens and workers over
their developmental fate. Moreover, this conflict will be
stronger and the proportion of larvae developing into
workers lower, the higher the levels of polyandry and
polygyny.
Discussion
Our model shows that potential conflict over investment
in workers can arise in colonies of eusocial Hymenoptera.
Although queens’ and workers’ inclusive fitness are max-
imal when the investment in workers is at the value that
maximizes colony productivity of gynes (Bourke and Chan
1999, this study), this optimum will be reached only when
a single party controls all decisions about resource allo-
cation. However, our model shows that single-party con-
trol of resource allocation is not evolutionarily stable be-
cause sex ratio conflict results in strong selection on the
other party to manipulate investment. Hence, the queen
will benefit from forcing workers to produce a less female-
biased sex allocation by altering the primary sex ratio and
limiting the number of eggs laid. Limitation of diploid
eggs will, in turn, induce workers to direct a higher pro-
portion of the female larvae into the gyne developmental
Sex Ratio Conflict and Worker Production 173
Figure 5: Evolutionary equilibria of the proportional investment in females ( f ) and the proportion of female larvae developing into workers (w)
(A) in function of queen mating frequency (k) with queen control of proportional investment in females, (B) in function of the number of nestmate
queens (n) with queen control of proportional investment in females, (C ) in function of queen mating frequency with worker control of proportional
investment in females, and (D) in function of the number of nestmate queens with worker control of proportional investment in females. Panels
A and C assume monogyny and equal paternity among males, and panels B and D assume that queens are full sisters (gQQ p 0.75, squares) or half-
sisters (gQQ p 0.5, diamonds), single mating, and equal contribution of queens to the production of workers, males, and gynes.
pathway so as to achieve a more female-biased sex allo-
cation. This tug-of-war between queens and workers re-
sults in an allocation of resources to workers that is lower
than the optimal value for queens and workers, and a sex
allocation intermediate between the queen and worker
optima.
Resolving Controversies among Earlier Work
Our findings shed light on the causes of discrepancies
between earlier theoretical studies on the existence of po-
tential queen-worker conflict over colony growth. These
studies had analyzed the problem from slightly differing
angles and under varying assumptions. Two of them came
to the conclusion that a conflict occurs (Pamilo 1991;
Bourke and Ratnieks 1999), whereas another concluded
that there is no conflict (Bourke and Chan 1999). Pamilo
(1991) found that the queen favors a higher investment
in colony growth than workers because queens value the
survival of the colony more than workers (survival being
higher with greater investment in workers). Workers, on
the other hand, would benefit more than queens from
investing in gyne production because they are more closely
related to sexual females than are queens. Pamilo’s expla-
nation is surprising because his model did not include
competition among colonies. Moreover, both queens and
workers should benefit most from queen-derived sexual
offspring compared to less related second-generation off-
spring (Bourke and Chan 1999). Similarly, Bourke and
Ratnieks (1999) suggested that queen and workers should
be in conflict over caste determination of individual female
larvae. In their analysis the authors assumed that per-
worker productivity declines with increased colony size,
and they graphically determined at which colony size each
party switches preference from raising larvae as workers
to raising them as gynes. Workers were found to favor a
switch to gyne production at a smaller colony size than
the queen. This is because workers are more closely related
to the larvae, and thus the fitness gained from producing
sexual sisters outweighs the benefits of increased overall
production.
A detailed analysis of these two studies provides an ex-
planation of why they predict a queen-worker conflict. To
derive the evolutionarily stable strategy, Pamilo (1991, eq.
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[13]) compared for each party the inclusive fitness gained
from investing into workers versus that gained through
gynes. This is exactly the trade-off that occurs when diploid
eggs are limited, in which case workers have to decrease
the investment in workers to bias sex allocation toward
more females. The same is true with Bourke and Ratnieks’s
(1999) analysis, because they considered the specific option
to direct a female larva into the gyne versus worker de-
velopmental pathway. Hence, the different queen and
worker optima stem from the decision ultimately affecting
colony sex allocation. By contrast, Bourke and Chan’s
(1999) model assumes a trade-off between worker pro-
duction versus colony productivity of sexuals (males and
females) without assuming any effect of this trade-off on
sex allocation. Our model shows that this is what occurs
when a single party has full control over colony sex al-
location, a situation that is indeed assumed in Bourke and
Chan’s (1999) model. As a consequence, Bourke and Chan
(1999) found that queens and workers agree on the
amount of resources to be directed to worker production.
Larval Self-Determination
Our model shows that female larvae and adult colony
members are generally in strong conflict over caste deter-
mination, confirming and generalizing earlier analyses
(Nonacs and Tobin 1992; Bourke and Ratnieks 1999). With
monandry and monogyny, there is a wide range of con-
ditions where female larvae benefit from becoming gynes,
whereas queens and workers would prefer them to develop
into workers. For more complex kin structure (polygyny
and polyandry), the conflict is even stronger and the in-
vestment in workers lower, the predicted value being 0
under a wide range of conditions. However, the prediction
of no larvae developing into workers has to be considered
with caution because it is dependent on the specific re-
lationship between per-worker productivity and colony
size that was chosen. Moreover, our model does not in-
clude seasonal variation in the probability for gynes to
successfully disperse and initiate new colonies. This may
be an important factor with, for example, female larvae
being more likely to develop into workers when the ex-
pected chances of successful dispersal are low.
The demonstration of a strong difference in interest
between female larvae and adult individuals raises the
question of who is in control of caste determination. In
many species, caste determination is influenced by the
amount and type of food provided to larvae (Wheeler
1986), suggesting that workers, which are usually the in-
dividuals that feed the larvae, should have a strong influ-
ence on caste determination. However, there are several
means by which female larvae may gain some control over
their developmental fate. First, in some species, larvae
probably can influence the amount of resource they obtain
and hence increase their probability of developing into a
gyne (Bourke and Ratnieks 1999). For example, in pocket-
making bumblebees, larvae feed autonomously in com-
munal mass-provisioned cells (Michener 1974; Bourke and
Ratnieks 1999). Strong competition between larvae seems
indeed to occur whereby larvae occupying a central po-
sition in the communal cell monopolize food and develop
more frequently into gynes than larvae in the periphery
(Michener 1974). Furthermore, workers of the pocket-
making bumblebees are more variable in size than workers
of pollen-storer species, which rear larvae in individual
cells continuously provisioned by workers (Michener
1974). The greater variance could stem from larvae’s at-
tempts to acquire more resources in order to trigger gyne
development.
An alternative route to gyne development is to decrease
the caste threshold (the size at which gyne development
is triggered; Wheeler 1986), thus allowing development
into a gyne with fewer resources than normally required.
A reduction in gyne size and caste threshold has apparently
evolved in parasitic ants (Nonacs and Tobin 1992; Aron
et al. 1999). In these species, female larvae are under strong
selection to develop into gynes because the worker tasks
are performed by the host workers and worker develop-
ment therefore offers only a relatively small fitness gain
for parasite larvae. Reduction of queen size has also been
documented in several nonparasitic Hymenoptera (Mich-
ener 1974; Brian 1983). Queens of reduced size (micro-
gynes) occur, for example, in the bee Trigona julianii (Ju-
liani 1967, cited in Michener 1974). It is interesting that,
in this species, queens are usually produced in special cells
but microgynes develop from worker cells (Michener
1974). This suggests that reduced size is the only way for
a female to develop into a gyne when in a worker cell.
Microgynes have also been found in several ants. However,
it is yet unclear whether the smaller size of these micro-
gynes has evolved as part of a selfish strategy to increase
the probability of developing into a gyne or is the result
of alternative reproductive strategies (Bourke and Franks
1995).
Finally, when a larva cannot modify the rate of food
intake nor reduce size and caste threshold, another option
is to increase its developmental time. However, it is unclear
whether workers may counteract such selfish larval strat-
egies, for example, by reducing the amount of food pro-
vided to larvae or being aggressive toward them. Workers
of some Myrmica species have for instance been reported
to provide less food to overwintering than to spring larvae
(Brian 1983). Aggression toward larvae developing into
gynes has been reported in several ant species (Fletcher
1986; Vargo and Passera 1991). The differential treatment
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of gyne-inclined larvae by workers may represent means
to incite larvae to develop into workers.
Identity of the Controlling Parties
Our model makes predictions that may allow us to test
which party controls reproductive decisions in the colony.
It predicts that the relative investment in workers, first,
should decrease with increased levels of polygyny and poly-
andry if larvae can influence their developmental fate, sec-
ond, not be affected by the levels of polygyny and poly-
andry if either workers or queens are in full control of
resource allocation, and third, increase with increased lev-
els of polygyny and polyandry if workers and queens share
control over resource allocation. These predictions can be
tested by comparing the size of colonies varying in their
kin structure because differences in the relative investment
in workers should translate in size differences between
mature colonies. Evidence for a lack of a relationship be-
tween colony size and kin structure comes from two ant
species, Formica truncorum (Sundstro¨m and Ratnieks
1998) and Formica exsecta (Sundstro¨m et al. 1996). In both
species, queens can mate singly or multiply, but colony
size is apparently not associated with queen mating fre-
quency. It is interesting that two lines of evidence suggest
that workers may indeed have an important influence on
resource allocation in these two species. First, the popu-
lation-wide sex-investment ratio is very close to the work-
ers’ optimum (Sundstro¨m 1994; Sundstro¨m et al. 1996).
Second, workers seem to have a significant influence on
reproductive decisions at the colony level because colonies
produce the sex to which workers are more related com-
pared to the population average, as predicted by split sex
ratio theory (Boomsma and Grafen 1990, 1991). That is,
colonies produce mostly females when the queen is singly
mated and males when the queen is multiply mated (Sund-
stro¨m 1994; Sundstro¨m et al. 1996). Workers seem to ma-
nipulate sex allocation to their advantage by selectively
eliminating males in colonies headed by singly mated
queens (Sundstro¨m et al. 1996). It remains to be inves-
tigated whether sex ratio manipulation also involves the
differential allocation of female brood to sexual and worker
development.
In the recent literature, queen control over sex allocation
is usually indirectly inferred from an even sex allocation
(e.g., Helms 1999). However, only rarely are attempts
made to investigate empirically the proximate mechanisms
of queen control that would present an alternative to pher-
omonal queen control (see Helms et al. 2000 for an ex-
ception). The lack of empirical tests is surprising given
that several authors have proposed the idea that queens
may prevent workers from biasing sex allocation toward
females by limiting the number of diploid eggs laid (Bul-
mer and Taylor 1981; Ratnieks and Reeve 1992; this study).
Furthermore, the ability of queens to equilibrate the sex
investment ratio by limiting diploid eggs is predicted to
be lower in species with well-marked gyne-worker di-
morphism (Bulmer and Taylor 1981) because, in species
with costly gynes, even a low number of eggs raised as
gynes represents a high investment in sexual females. Thus,
a higher investment in gynes does not come at the cost
of a significant decrease in colony productivity as a result
of lower worker production.
The predicted association between gyne-worker dimor-
phism and queen’s ability to manipulate colony sex al-
location is intriguing because it may provide an expla-
nation for the observed positive correlation between sexual
dimorphism and female bias across ant species. Boomsma
(1989) first noted the existence of this association and
suggested that it might be due to a methodological artifact
with female bias in sex investment ratio tending to be
increasingly overestimated as sexual dimorphism increases
(see also Boomsma et al. 1995). However, the association
between sexual dimorphism and female bias is also pre-
dicted if queens limit the number of female eggs because
sexual dimorphism tends to be positively correlated with
gyne-worker dimorphism in ants (L. Keller, unpublished
data). Hence, queens should have less control over sex
allocation and it should be more female biased in species
with greater sexual dimorphism. Experiments are needed
to determine whether queen-worker conflict over sex al-
location indeed leads to limitation of female eggs and
whether the occurrence of egg limitation is negatively cor-
related with gyne-worker and gyne-male dimorphism. If
such a negative correlation exists, one would expect a
greater ability of workers to control resource allocation in
species with a greater degree of sexual and gyne-worker
dimorphism. This tendency toward complete worker con-
trol should translate into a greater investment in workers,
and one would thus predict a positive relationship between
gyne-worker dimorphism and colony size, as indeed is the
case across species of social Hymenoptera (Bourke 1999).
However, there are also other reasons to expect such an
association (see Bourke 1999).
A situation similar to female egg limitation occurs when
queens and males are successful in concealing the sex of
the brood in order to resist the workers’ manipulation of
colony sex allocation (Nonacs and Carlin 1990; Nonacs
1993). If the deception is successful up to a developmental
stage at which the fitness gain of biasing the sex allocation
does not compensate for the loss of the energy already
invested in rearing the males, the workers are forced to
raise offspring in the sex ratio produced by the queen
(Nonacs and Carlin 1990; Chapuisat et al. 1997). Under
such conditions, the only reproductive decision possibly
remaining under the control of the workers is the pro-
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portion of females developing into gynes versus workers,
given that female caste can be influenced beyond the point
where brood sex becomes apparent. There is limited ev-
idence that sexual deception may occur in ants (Nonacs
and Carlin 1990; Chapuisat et al. 1997), but well-designed
experiments still need to be conducted to demonstrate
unambiguously its occurrence.
Conclusion
This study explicitly delineates the conditions under
which there is a conflict between queens, workers, and
larvae over resource allocation to the production of
workers, gynes, and males. It makes predictions about
how variation in queen number and queen mating fre-
quency should affect worker production depending on
which party controls resource allocation. Our model also
integrates key life-history parameters in sex allocation
theory, which will hopefully stimulate more empirical
research on the strategies pursued by queens, workers,
and female brood to maximize their inclusive fitness.
These studies would help to broaden our understanding
of the factors shaping the life history of hymenopteran
colonies and may provide explanations for many ex-
amples of observed sex allocation patterns that cannot
be accounted for by the models of sex ratio theory avail-
able so far (Bourke and Franks 1995; Crozier and Pamilo
1996; Chapuisat and Keller 1999).
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